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(2) The 'object' or 'content' of thought is often imageless. In the race, meaning is prior to thought; and in the individual (in the rudimentary thought of the infant) thought is prior to language. Hence, while imagery and language are necessary for the growth of mind, it is not surprising that we, with this growth behind us, should, especially in abstract or unimpeded thought, employ a "short cut or abbreviation" whose final result is "mere awareness." To do this is, after all, only to discard the elaborate machinery of words and images for a more primitive tool of consciousness; though the tool has, of course, been formed and sharpened under the influence of mental development at large. As for the mechanism of awareness, "the probability is that we come to construct for ourselves various 'schemata,' as Head calls them, *i. e.*, systems of unconscious dispositions," upon the basis of which presentations are apprehended; thus we apprehend size under the unconscious influence of a schema of distance; and there are similar schemata for meaning, and for other spatial, as well as for temporal and logical relations. 'Mere awareness' would then, I suppose, stand for the lowest conscious terms in which a situation can be assimilated to a schema.

(3) Above both act and content of the thought stands a directive awareness: a knowledge, *e. g.*, of whether and how one can solve a given problem. "This need not be present in the form of a thought content;" that is to say, if I understand the author, it may exist simply as an unconscious schema.—

The index to both Parts is appended to Pt. I., so that the user of Pt. II. must turn for his references to the companion volume. This arrangement is a mistake. The author should also know better than to refer to Stout's "Analytical Psychology." E. B. T.

The Philosophy of Music: a comparative investigation into the principles of musical aesthetics. By H. H. BRITAN. New York, Longmans Green & Co. 1911. pp. xiv., 252.

The problem of a 'philosophy of music' is threefold. It has, first, "to determine as clearly and as accurately as possible the nature of the psychological processes involved in the musical experience." This psychological analysis is imperative: for little systematic work of the kind has yet been done; the mental reactions are so subtle and intangible that superficial work upon them leads to exaggeration and vague generalities; and only through psychology can music be related to other manifestations of human thought and action; the principles of musical criticism, *e. g.*, are in the last resort psychologically grounded. The philosophy of music has, secondly, to consider the relation of music, not only to other arts, but also to morality, religion, education. And it has, thirdly, to face the ontological question, and to discover "what is the essential, irreducible content when analysis has reduced the subject to its lowest terms." After an introductory chapter on Musical Form, these three problems are taken up. A 'Psychological Analysis of the Elements of Music' treats of the first,—of the psychology of rhythm, melody, harmony, musical expression; and a 'Philosophy of Music' treats of the other two,—of the universality, versatility and power of music, the content of music, musical criticism, and the educational value of music.

The book has evidently been written *con amore*, and there are parts of it that I have read with interest. I am also unreservedly on the side of any author who seeks to train the musical intelligence and heighten the musical feeling of his time. On the other hand, it is impossible to

grant that the present writer has proved adequate to his task. "While the bibliography of music is voluminous," he tells us, "attempts at a scientific psychological analysis of music, and at a systematic discussion of the principles of musical aesthetics are surprisingly few." Let this be admitted: is there, then, not all the more reason to utilise what we have? And Professor Britan has apparently failed to find—at any rate he has not utilised—Stumpf, or Lipps, or Wundt's volume on Art, or Wallaschek, or Riemann, or Siebeck, or Moos, or indeed anybody of that ilk except Hanslick, to say nothing of the magazine-writers! The omissions are astonishing. And when Hanslick is introduced, his name merely points the difference between 'formalists' and 'expressionists'; why there should be such a difference, or how it originated historically, the reader may think out for himself; that Hanslick stands over against Hauptmann, with Schopenhauer and the evolutionists between, he must learn from other sources. As to the content of music, it has two elements: the sensuous qualities of musical sound, which arouse direct sense-feeling, and musical thought, which arouses an intellectual activity whereby the purest and richest aesthetic emotion is gained. "To explain why such intellectual activity should give pleasure, we shall refer, in lieu of a better one, to the biological theory of pleasure and its function."

E. B. T.

Laughter; an essay on the meaning of the comic. By H. BERGSON.
Translated by C. BRERETON and F. ROTHWELL. New York, The Macmillan Co., 1911. pp. vi., 200. Price \$1.25 net.

Bergson's theory of the comic has now been before the world for some dozen years, and is probably familiar to the readers of this JOURNAL. All modes of human life, he says,—individual selfhood, society, language,—are in their proper nature supple and elastic, alert and active, ever moving and never repeating, irreversible, unique. But there is always the danger of rigidity, of automatism. Whenever, then, we find in human thoughts, words, actions, affairs, anything inert, mechanical, repeatable, stereotyped, we instinctively recognise it as non-adaptive and as requiring correction. Laughter is the social gesture whereby this correction is administered; it implies a certain callousness and indifference, even a touch of malice in the laughter. The sphere of the comic is a sort of neutral zone, beyond the region of emotion and struggle, in which a man's interest in his neighbour is predominantly an interest of simple curiosity, but in which, nevertheless, a sharp lookout is kept for anything that threatens the desirable maximum of elasticity and sociability. Comedy is, therefore, not life; neither is it art; for art is individualistic, its sole object being 'to brush aside the utilitarian symbols, the conventional and socially accepted generalities, in short, everything that veils reality from us, in order to bring us face to face with reality itself;' while comedy looks outward, seeks the similar and the typical. It is not life, while yet it pursues the utilitarian aim of social improvement; it is not art, while yet it comes into being when society and the individual, freed from the anxieties of self-preservation, begin to regard themselves as works of art; it lies, in fact, midway between art and life.

On these principles, Bergson accounts for the whole of the comedian's stock in trade, from the portly gentleman's slip on the orange peel to the cross purposes of Mr. Dale's visit to Patterner Hall. The theory has been assimilated, whole or part, by Lippians and Freudians, and has been variously criticised by the independents;